montgomery v louisiana cornell

 It is undisputed, then, that Teague requires the retroactive application of new substantive and watershed procedural rules in federal habeas proceedings.  The majority’s imposition of Teague’s first exception upon the States is all the worse because it does not adhere to that exception as initially conceived by Justice Harlan—an exception for rules that “place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 692 (emphasis added). Courts have reached different conclusions on this point. It was this rejection that drew Justice Harlan’s reproach in Desist and later in Mackey. States can stop entertaining claims alleging that this Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions invalidated a sentence, and leave federal habeas courts to shoulder the burden of adjudicating such claims in the first instance. Relying on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, and Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, Miller recognized that children differ from adults in their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” 567 U. S., at ___, and that these distinctions “diminish the penological justifications” for imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders, id., at ___.  Today’s decision repudiates established principles of finality. Id., at 572. But in light of “children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,” Miller made clear that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Ibid. It is a decision about this Court’s statutory power to grant the Original Writ, not about its constitutional obligation to do so.  Amicus, however, reads too much into these statements.  The majority also misappropriates Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211 (1988), which reviewed a state habeas petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim that the jury instructions at his trial lessened the State’s burden to prove every element of his offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Teague held that federal habeas courts could no longer upset state-court convictions for violations of so-called “new rules,” not yet announced when the conviction became final. While the Court held that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are generally not retroactive, it recognized that courts must give retroactive effect to new watershed procedural rules and to substantive rules of constitutional law.  To begin, Article III does not contain the requirement that the Court announces today. And then, in Godfather fashion, the majority makes state legislatures an offer they can’t refuse: Avoid all the utterly impossible nonsense we have prescribed by simply “permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole.” Ante, at 21. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, state collateral review courts have no greater power than federal habeas courts to mandate that a prisoner continue to suffer punishment barred by the  Constitution.  These considerations underlay the Court’s holding in Miller that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for children “pos[e] too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17). We have never understood due process to require further proceedings once a trial ends. (quoting Graham, supra, at 71; internal quotation marks omitted). subject its trial-court determinations to no review whatever, it could a fortiori subject them to review which consists of a nonadversarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of government experts”). of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Amdts. In February 2017, Montgomery, now 70 years old, remained a prisoner at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola.  The Constitution mentions habeas relief only in the Suspension Clause, which specifies that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Art. Record received from the Supreme Court of Louisiana. (“[T]he writ has historically been available for attacking convictions on [substantive] grounds”). See Mackey, 401 U. S., at 693 (opinion of Harlan, J.) That Clause merely supplies a rule of decision: If a federal constitutional right exists, that right supersedes any contrary provisions of state law. Of the natural places to look—Article III, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause of  the Fourteenth Amendment—none establishes a right to void an unconstitutional sentence that has long been final. 3d 137 (per curiam). If, as the Court supposes, the Constitution bars courts from insisting that prisoners remain in prison when their convictions or sentences are later deemed unconstitutional, why can courts let stand a judgment that wrongly decided any constitutional question? Doing away with Linkletter for good, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s solution to “the retroactivity problem” for cases pending on collateral review—which he described not as a constitutional problem but as “a problem as to the scope of the habeas writ.” Mackey, supra, at 684 (emphasis added). Montgomery, now 69 years old, has spent almost his entire life in prison. The population of Montgomery was 726 at the 2010 census. State v. Mead, 2014–1051, p. 3 (La. However, neither Teague nor Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264—which concerned only Teague’s general retroactivity bar for new constitutional rules of criminal procedure—had occasion to address whether States are required as a constitutional matter to give retroactive effect to new substantive rules. To ensure this conclusion is correct, the Court appointed Richard D. Bernstein as amicus curiaeto brief and argue the position that the Court lacks jurisdiction. Fidelity to this important principle of federalism,  however, should not be construed to demean the substantive character of the federal right at issue. But, as Justice Harlan had explained, that view of Article III has no force on collateral review: “While the entire theoretical underpinnings of judicial review and constitutional supremacy dictate that federal courts having jurisdiction on direct review adjudicate every issue of law . . . L. Rev., at 467–468, and n. 56, 471. (Distributed) Sep 23 2015 Reply brief of Court-appointed amicus curiae filed. before imposing a particular penalty.” 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20). 655, 661–667, 1 N. E. 3d 270, 278–282 (2013); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S. C. 534, 548, 765 S. E. 2d 572, 578 (2014); State v. Mares, 2014 WY 126, ¶¶47–63, 335 P. 3d 487, 504–508; and People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶41, 6  N. E. 3d 709, 722. The Court invokes only the Supremacy Clause, asserting that the Clause deprives state and federal postconviction courts alike of power to leave an unconstitutional sentence in place. If it were a denial of equal protection to hold an earlier defendant to a law more stringent than what exists today, it would also be a denial of equal protection to hold a later defendant to a law more stringent than what existed 50 years ago. To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. As Siebold stated, it was forbidden to use the federal habeas writ “as a mere writ of error.” 100 U. S., at 375. “The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, [could] give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.” Ibid. Because the Constitution does not require postconviction remedies, it certainly does not require postconviction courts to revisit every potential type of error. Even then, the Court reassured States that “the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction,” implicitly still available for juveniles. Under Louisiana law, this verdict required the trial court to impose a sentence of life without parole. Const., Amdt. This whole exercise, this whole distortion of Miller, is just a devious way of eliminating life without parole for juvenile offenders. Petitioner states that he helped establish an inmate boxing team, of which he later became a trainer and coach. When a new substantive rule of constitutional law is established, this Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems. The parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. States may not disregard a controlling, constitutional command in their own courts. III, §2.  I doubt that today’s rule will fare any better.  All that remains to support the majority’s conclusion is that all-purpose Latin canon: ipse dixit. i. Siebold did not imply that the Constitution requires courts to stop enforcing convictions under an unconstitutional law. In 2016, the Supreme Court did so in Montgomery v. Louisiana, holding that Miller announced a substantive rule to be applied retroactively in cases on collateral review. Old or new? “No circumstances call more for the invocation of a rule of complete retroactivity.” Ibid. Linkletter began with the premise “that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision  retrospectively” and went on to adopt an equitable rule-by-rule approach to retroactivity, considering “the prior his- tory of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Id., at 629.  The Linkletter framework proved unworkable when the Court began applying the rule-by-rule approach not only to cases on collateral review but also to cases on direct review, rejecting any distinction “between convictions now final” and “convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 300 (1967).  Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), set forth a framework for retroactiv- ity in cases on federal collateral review. Jones also contends that the Supreme Court's holding in Montgomery v. Louisiana transformed the "permanent incorrigibility" standard into an item of substantive constitutional law, and that lower courts incorrectly apply the Montgomery holding where they do not make a finding on incorrigibility. Nowhere in Siebold did this Court intimate that relief was constitutionally required—or as the majority puts it, that a court would have had “no authority” to leave in place Siebold’s conviction, ante, at 11.  The majority’s sorry acknowledgment that “Siebold and the other cases discussed in this opinion, of course, do not directly control the question the Court now answers for the first time,” ibid., is not nearly enough of a disclaimer. The father enrolled in a part time law program and after 9 years graduated and acce… The mother had primary care and the father had generous access. Until today, it was Congress’s prerogative to do away with Teague’s exceptions altogether.  The category of substantive rules discussed in Teague originated in Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity. But the Supremacy Clause cannot possibly answer the question before us here. Although Teague describes new substantive rules as an exception to the bar on retroactive application of procedural rules, this Court has recognized that substantive rules “are more accurately characterized as . . . Ann. What provision of the Constitution could conceivably produce such a result? Protection against disproportionate punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a defendant’s sentence. Of course the italicized phrase begs the question.  The procedure Miller prescribes is no different. That Clause prohibits a State from “de ny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Amdt. In Siebold, however, the petitioners attacked the judgments on the ground that they had been convicted under unconstitutional statutes.   (b) When a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule. Because Justice Bradley’s dicta in Siebold was a gloss on the 1789 Judiciary Act, Congress could at least supply a fix to it.  The Supremacy Clause does not do so. 552 U. S., at 281–282. These differences result from children’s “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” and are apparent in three primary ways: “First, children have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. 489 U. S., at 310. Miller, it is true, did not bar a punishment for all juvenile offenders, as the Court did in Roper or Graham. Rather, it endorses the exception as expanded by Penry, to include “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” 492 U. S., at 330. The parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. The distinctions . . . 1970). To ensure this conclusion is correct, the Court appointed Richard D. Bernstein as amicus curiae to brief and argue the position that the Court lacks jurisdiction. For that reason, Miller is no less substantive than are Roper and Graham.” Ante, at 17–18. I, §9, cl.  Only in 1987, in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, did this Court change course and hold that the Constitution requires courts to give constitutional rights some retroactive effect. Montgomery alleges that Miller announced a substantive constitutional rule and that the Louisiana Supreme Court erred by failing to recognize its retroactive effect. 11/5/13), 130 So. Article III vests “[t]he judicial Power” in this Court and whatever inferior courts Congress creates, Art. These precedents did not in volve a state court’s postconviction review of a conviction or sentence and so did not address whether the Constitution requires new substantive rules to have retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review. Statement of the Facts: In 1963, 17-year-old Montgomery killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana. But Siebold—a case construing the scope of federal habeas review under the 1789 Judiciary Act—does not support the Court’s position. Proc. Today, we grant, vacate, and remand these cases in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U. S. ___ (2016), for the lower courts to consider whether petitioners’ sentences comport with the exacting limits the Eighth Amendment imposes on sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole. If the Constitution prevented courts from enforcing a void conviction or sentence even after the conviction is final, this Court would have been incapable of withdrawing relief. 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1). Procedural rules, in contrast, are designed to enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating “the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Schriro, 542 U. S., at 353; Teague, supra, at 313. It is true, if no writ of error lies, the judgment may be final, in the sense that there may be no means of reversing it. Those prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life sentences. He urged that “all ‘new’ rules of constitutional law must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this Court at the time the ‘new’ decision is handed down.” Desist, supra, at 258 (dissenting opinion). But that leaves the question of what provision of the Constitution supplies that underlying prohibition. Placing the rule’s first exception in context requires more analysis than the majority has applied. Ante, at 12. See ante, at 8–14. (Distributed) Oct 13 2015 That constitutional command is, like all federal law, binding on state courts. 304, 340–341, 344 (1816); see also Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 218 (1988) (when a State has not “placed any limit on the issues that it will entertain in collateral proceedings . . . Under that understanding, due process excluded any right to have new substantive rules apply retroactively. In a similar vein, when the Constitution prohibits a particular form of punishment  for a class of persons, an affected prisoner receives a procedure through which he can show that he belongs to the protected class. not subject to the bar.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 352, n. 4 (2004).  Louisiana suggests that Miller cannot have made a constitutional distinction between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption because Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility. A state court need only apply the law as it existed at the time a defendant’s conviction and sen tence became final. I respectfully dissent. for Cert. The need for incapacitation is lessened, too, because ordinary adolescent development diminishes the likelihood that a juvenile offender “ ‘forever will be a danger to society.’ ” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (quoting Graham, 560 U. S., at 72). In 1963, 17-year-old Henry Montgomery was arrested for the murder of Sheriff Deputy Charles Hurt in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. See ibid. Unlike procedural rules, which govern the manner in which a defendant could be found guilty for their illegal conduct, substantive rules are Id. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989). Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (1992). “By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence,” mandatory life without parole “poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17). Only 15 pages later, after softening the reader with 3 pages of obfuscating analysis, does the majority dare to attribute to Miller that which Miller explicitly denies. Court-appointed amicus contends that because Teague was an interpretation of the federal habeas statute,  not a constitutional command, its retroactivity holding has no application in state collateral review proceedings. Rehabilitation is not a satisfactory rationale, either. An illegal sentence “is primarily restricted to those instances in which the term of the prisoner’s sentence is not authorized by the statute or statutes which govern the penalty” for the crime of conviction. 142, 151 (1970) (“Broadly speaking, the original sphere for collateral attack on a conviction was where the tribunal lacked jurisdiction either in the usual sense or because the statute under which the defendant had been prosecuted was unconstitutional or because the sentence was one the court could not lawfully impose” (footnotes omitted)). In 1963, Montgomery killed Charles Hurt, a deputy sheriff in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Teague recognized, however, two categories of rules that are not subject to its general retroactivity bar. Montgomery then filed an application for a supervisory writ. At the time of that decision, “[m]ere error in the judgment or proceedings, under and by virtue of which a party is imprisoned, constitute[d] no ground for the issue of the writ.” Id., at 375. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that Miller is retroactive because it announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. See Siebold, 100 U. S., at 376. Mission accomplished. The deterrence  rationale likewise does not suffice, since “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults—their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment.” 567 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 9–10) (internal quotation marks omitted). Miller requires that before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, the sentencing judge take into account “how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Ibid. 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